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INTRODUCTION
As federal, state, and local governments have increased en-
forcement of rigorous environmental laws, such as the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act ("RCRA"), and numerous state analogs, potential envi-
ronmentally-related liabilities have increased dramatically. The vast
majority of these laws spread costs among commercial entities and
other users of land without regard to ordinary notions of causation
or fault. Consequently, liability for environmental hazards often
falls on parties who have never handled hazardous materials or who
have handled their chemicals and waste in a responsible manner.
Companies that hired reputable haulers to take their waste to li-
censed recyclers or disposal facilities,' companies that purchased
businesses that properly sent waste to landfills, 2 landowners whose
underground storage tanks have leaked without their knowledge,3
and landowners who discover pollution on their property caused by
adjacent or former landowners can all be held liable for the stagger-
1 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 631 (1st Cir. 1989);
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa.
1987); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127,
477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1984).
2 See, e.g., New York v. SCA Servs., 83 Civ. 6402 P.N.L., 1983 Hazardous Waste
Lit. Rep. 4527 (complaint filed Aug. 29, 1983 S.D.N.Y.).
3 See, e.g., C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F.
Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648,
477 N.E.2d 146, review denied, 395 Mass. 1105, 482 N.E.2d 328 (1985); Aronson Assocs.
v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 99 Dauph. 446, 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (Ct. C.P.
1977), aft'd, 272 Pa. Super. 606, 422 A.2d 689 (Super. Ct. 1979).
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ing costs of environmental remediation. 4
As both the range of activities giving rise to environmental lia-
bility and the cost of cleanup has increased, liability insurance cover-
age has become critical to the economic stability of many
businesses. Since 1966, most businesses have purchased compre-
hensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policies which provide
protection against liability arising from "occurrences" during the
policy period.5 Because companies and individuals are now being
held liable for environmental problems that originated six, ten, or
twenty years ago, insureds are looking to the CGL insurance policies
that they purchased in past years and demanding that the insurers
who issued those policies defend and indemnify them against envi-
ronmental claims. 6
CGL policies issued between 1973 and 1985 generally contain
an exclusion of coverage for discharges, dispersals, releases, and es-
capes (collectively "releases") of pollutants that are not "sudden
and accidental." Insurers and insureds quarrel over the meaning of
the phrase "sudden and accidental," the scope of the policy provi-
sion in which it is found (designated in most policies as exclusion
"f"), and the relationship between exclusion "f" and related provi-
sions in the standard form CGL policy. Such disputes have pro-
duced a mammoth amount of litigation in virtually every state in the
country. However, over a decade of litigation has done little to clar-
ify the scope of coverage for environmental incidents or the mean-
ing of "sudden and accidental" in CGL policies. 7 In fact, peculiar
4 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (insured developer sued by condominium purchasers upon discovery
that contamination had leached from adjacent landfill); Summit Assocs. v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 229 NJ. Super. 56, 550 A.2d 1235 (App. Div. 1988) (insured liable for
unknown sewage treatment activities of previous municipal landowner); Powers
Chemco., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1988)
(insured liable for waste buried by previous landowner), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548
N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989); see also Evans v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
107 Misc. 2d 710, 435 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (insured liable to government for
cleanup of gasoline spill caused by vandals).
5 Pre-1966 policies generally provided coverage for "accidents," a term not de-
fined in those policies. Discussion of pre-1966 policies is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, except to provide background for the development and interpretation of the
"occurrence-based" policies in effect between 1970 and 1985. See infra Section II(B)(1).
6 Occurrence-based policies provide what is sometimes called "prospective cover-
age"; if damage or injury occurs during the policy period, the insurer is obligated to
provide coverage regardless of when a claim may be brought against the insured.
7 As the court in Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1549-50 (S.D. Fla. 1987) aptly noted:
[Tlhere is a plethora of authority [on exclusion "''] from jurisdictions
throughout the United States which, depending on the facts presented
and the allegations of the underlying complaints, go "both ways" on the
issues presented today. The cases swim the reporters like fish in a lake.
The Defendants would have this Court pull up its line with a trout on the
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applications of logic and an overgeneralized approach to precedent
in a number of decisions have compounded the confusion.
This Article presents a multifaceted analysis of the "sudden and
accidental" standard form pollution exclusion in an effort to derive
a common sense, workable interpretation of the exclusion, and to
identify the types of pollution "occurrences" that should and should
not be covered by CGL policies. The analysis is subdivided into
three sections. Section I examines the respective meanings of the
words "sudden" and "accidental" and their contextual meaning in
the phrase "sudden and accidental." Section II examines an in-
sured's reasonable expectations of coverage under exclusion "f",
the historical development and use of the clause by the insurance
industry, and the objectives of state insurance regulators who ap-
proved the exclusion. Section III analyzes the history ofjudicial in-
terpretations of exclusion "f" and the proliferation of approaches
and holdings throughout the past decade.
I
THE MEANING OF "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL": THE
LANGUAGE AND ITS USE
Exclusion "f" of the standard form CGL policy that was widely
issued between 1973 and 1985 states that:
This insurance does not apply... (f) to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, li-
quids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course
or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.8
Stated simply, the policy provides coverage for bodily injury or
property damage due to a sudden and accidental release of pollu-
tants. The debate over the scope of the "sudden and accidental"
exception to exclusion "f" has taken a number of forms. Generally,
however, insurers contend that any event which does not end
quickly cannot be sudden and accidental, and insureds argue that an
event which they did not intend and of which they had brief or no
notice is a sudden and accidental event, regardless of its duration.
A. The Word "Sudden"
The phrase "sudden and accidental" is not defined in the stan-
hook, and argue that the lake is full of trout only, when in fact the water is
full of bass, salmon and sunfish too.
8 See, e.g., Insurance Services Office ("ISO") form GL 00 02, Ed. 01-73 (emphasis
added).
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dard form CGL policy, nor are the words "sudden" or "accidental."
As a rule, in the absence of a specific definition in a policy, the terms
of an insurance contract are interpreted in accordance with the
plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning of the language
employed.9
Dictionaries list the primary definitions of "sudden" as "hap-
pening without warning," "unforeseen," "not prepared for," "un-
expected," and, in some cases, "abrupt." The word "sudden" is
derived from the past participle of the Latin word "subire," mean-
ing "to come up, occur unexpectedly."' 0 Thus, the root meaning of
the word implies nothing about the duration of an event. Some dic-
tionaries do not define "sudden" in terms of duration at all; others
list duration-related definitions as secondary."
9 See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga.
1987); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d
520 (Ch. Div. 1975), af'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), certifica-
tion denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
10 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2284 (1986).
11 Readily available dictionaries define "sudden" as follows:
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2d ed.
1983):
1. happening without previous notice; coming or appearing unexpect-
edly; not foreseen or prepared for; as, a sudden emergency.
2. done, coming, or taking place quickly or abruptly; hasty...
Syn.-unanticipated, unexpected, unlooked-for.
THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1066 (1982):
occurring or come upon or made or done unexpectedly or without warn-
ing, abrupt, abnormally rapid, hurried, (sudden need, fear; a sudden resolve,
departure, change, turn of the wrist, bend in the road .... )
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d college ed. 1982):
1. Happening without warning; unforeseen: a sudden storm.
2. Characterized by hastiness; abrupt; rash: a sudden departure.
3. Characterized by rapidity; quick; swift.
THE ILLUSTRATED HERITAGE DICTIONARY AND INFORMATION Boox(1977):
1. Happening without warning; unforeseen.
2. Characterized by hastiness; abrupt; rash.
3. Characterized by rapidity; quick; swift...
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989):
A. adj. l.a. Of actions, events, conditions:
Happening or coming without warning or premonition; taking place or
appearing all at once. In some contexts the implication is rather "Unex-
pected, unforeseen, unlooked-for", or "Not prepared or provided for".
b. Of emotions, impulses, etc.
c. Of a turning etc.: Abrupt, sharp ...
3.a. Performed or taking place without delay; speedy; prompt,
immediate....
b. sudden death (slang): (a) a single toss used to decide an issue; hence in
Lawn Tennis, a game played to break a tie; also in general sporting use...
designating an additional competition or period of extra time in which
the first to concede a game or score is immediately eliminated ....
4.a. Of persons: Swift in action, quick to perform, prompt, expeditious
8. Brief, momentary, lasting only a short time.
[Vol. 75:610
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Thus, dictionaries support insureds' position that "happening
without warning" or "unexpected" is the primary definition of
"sudden." However, "sudden" and "unexpected" are not inter-
changeable in all circumstances. For example, a tidal wave may be
predicted in advance (i.e., be expected) and yet strike suddenly.
Conversely, the transformation of an ugly baby into a beautiful adult
may occur unexpectedly, but normally would not be described as
sudden. To be sudden, an event must begin abruptly, or, at least,
be experienced as having begun abruptly.1 2 In other words, the
event or condition did not exist one moment and does exist in the
next moment.
This temporal element of "sudden" is so basic and capable of
such broad application that it is often ignored or dismissed as incon-
sequential by parties and courts interpreting liability policies. Fail-
ure to understand this element has led some insureds to argue that
the commonly understood meaning of "sudden" has no temporal
element.13 Courts that have not carefully considered the temporal
nature of "sudden" have confused it with brevity and have asserted
that an event which does not end quickly cannot be sudden.1 4 Cer-
tainly some "sudden" events do end quickly, due to the physical
properties of the activity, such as a "sudden shot." However, a shot
into the air could still be described as a "sudden shot" although the
bullet might travel for miles and an indeterminate period of time.
The dictionaries' various illustrations of sudden events are not
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED (2d ed.
1987):
1. happening, coming, made, or done quickly,without warning, or unex-
pectedly: a sudden attack.
2. occurring without transition from the previous form, state, etc.; ab-
rupt: a sudden turn.
3. impetuous; rash.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (5th ed. 1979):
Happening without previous notice or with very brief notice; coming or
occurring unexpectedly; unforeseen; unprepared for (citation omitted).
12 In common usage, people use the word "sudden" to describe an event or condi-
tion they experience as beginning abruptly. See e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 259 Ga. 333, 335, 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1989) ("Suddenly, it's spring.").
13 Insureds have apparently argued that the term "sudden" need not have a tempo-
ral element. See, e.g., Benedictine Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1987); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), affd, 875 F.2d 868
(6th Cir. 1989); Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 NJ.
Super. 516, 535-36, 528 A.2d 76, 86 (App. Div. 1987).
14 See, e.g., C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F.
Supp. 265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 1317, 1326-27 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co., No. C-3939-84, 1988 HAZARDOUS WASTE LIT. REP. 12,045 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1988), rev'd, 231 N.J. Super. 1, 554 A.2d 1342 (App. Div. 1989).
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events that necessarily end quickly. For example, Webster's New
Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged illustrates the meaning of sud-
den with the phrase "sudden emergency."' 15 A sudden emergency is
one which arises abruptly and unexpectedly. The duration of the
emergency is irrelevant to the concept. 16 A "sudden need" begins
abruptly but need not end quickly.' 7 Similarly, a "sudden attack,"
"sudden fear," and "sudden resolve" may be of long or short dura-
tion.' 8 Compare a "sudden recognition" of an old schoolmate that
may continue for one's lifetime with a "sudden explosion" lasting
less than a minute, and a "sudden heat wave" which could last one
day or several weeks.19 In common usage, a "sudden" event is one
which begins abruptly or without previous notice, irrespective of
whether the duration of that event is short or long.
B. The Word "Accidental"
Dictionaries typically define the word "accidental" as "arising
from or produced by extrinsic, secondary, or additional causes or
forces." 20 Other common definitions include "occurring sometimes
with unfortunate results by chance alone," "unpredictable," and
"happening or ensuing without design, intent, or obvious motiva-
tion." Synonyms include "fortuitous," "adventitious," "contin-
15 See definition provided in WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED, supra notel 1.
16 Black's Law Dictionary describes the critical elements of a sudden emergency in its
definition of the "sudden emergency doctrine":
When a person finds himself confronted with a sudden emergency ...
such person has the legal right to do what appears to him at the time he
should do ... to avoid any injury, and if he does so act, he will not be
deemed to have been negligent even though it might afterwards be ap-
parent that some other course of action would have been safer. Under
sudden emergency doctrine, one placed in position of sudden emergency
or peril other than by his own negligence, is not held to same degree of
care and prudence as one who has time for thought and reflection.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). The term "sudden"
as used in the doctrine of "sudden emergency" necessarily refers to situations that begin
abruptly or are perceived abruptly, and are unanticipated, rather than to emergencies
that end quickly. In fact, if such situations ended quickly, no rationale would explain the
"sudden emergency" doctrine; it is because a sudden emergency appears not to be fleet-
ing, and triggers an immediate response, the negligence standard of care is relaxed.
17 See supra note 11.
18 See supra note 11. Other common examples include "sudden change of heart,"
"sudden lapse in judgment," and "sudden memory loss."
19 This analysis also applies when "sudden" is used to modify an object rather than
an event. For example, a "sudden turn in the road" or "sudden drop-off' in terrain
refers to geographic features which have abrupt starting points. A sudden turn need not
end quickly or turn back; a sudden drop-off need not immediately rise again. See WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2284 (1986): "[T]his ridge
forms an important and [sudden] break between the land of abundant ground water...
and the dry land." (quoting P.E. James).
20 See, e.g., id.
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gent," "casual," and "incidental. "21
These definitions indicate that the word "accidental" may be
used to describe both unexpected events and unintended, fortu-
itous, chance events that are highly foreseeable. 22 For example, a
person may walk carefully down a paved road carrying a covered
pail and trip, accidentally spilling the pail's contents. In this case,
the word "accidental" conveys an element of unexpectedness. On
the other hand, if the person runs down a gravel path when the sun
is in his eyes with a full, uncovered pail, a spill should not be unex-
pected although it could be described as accidental. The context in
which the word is used dictates whether "accidental" simply means
fortuitous, or whether it describes an event that is both fortuitous
and unexpected.
C. "Sudden and Accidental"
As demonstrated above, the word "sudden" and the word "ac-
cidental" may each be used to describe both expected and unex-
pected events. The words "sudden" and "accidental," then, could
be used together to describe an event that begins abruptly and is
fortuitous, whether or not the event is expected. As noted above,
however, both words are commonly used to describe events that are
unexpected, and, as one court noted, "the phrase 'sudden and acci-
dental' should be construed in its entirety, without undue reliance
upon discrete definitions. ' 23 When combined as a phrase in the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion, the
words suggest that coverage is provided for, and limited to, releases
of pollutants that begin abruptly, are fortuitous, and that arise with-
out warning, or unexpectedly.
D. Clearing Muddy Waters
The linguistic analysis of "sudden and accidental" highlights
two misconceptions that have been a source of conflict between in-
sureds and insurers. The first misconception involves the temporal
21 Id. Other dictionary definitions include WEBSTER'S NiNTH NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 49 (1986):
1. arising from extrinsic causes: incidental, nonessential
2. (a) occurring unexpectedly or by chance, (b) happening without in-
tent or through carelessness and often with unfortunate results.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 15 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted):
Happening by chance, or unexpectedly; taking place not according to
usual course of things; casual; fortuitous.
22 See Primm v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 426 So. 2d 356, 359-60 (La. Ct.
App. 1983), in which the court noted that the word "accident" may describe an event
which is "unexpected or an event happening by chance."
23 Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 145 A.D.2d 180, 182,
538 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (App. Div. 1989).
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element of "sudden;" the second involves the relationship between
the words "sudden" and "gradual."
1. The Temporal Element of "Sudden" Claified: Claussen v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
Many courts have foundered on the misperception that a defini-
tion of "sudden" that excludes the concept of brevity contains no
temporal element.24 Some courts have held that "sudden" needs
no temporal element.25  Others have rejected this position as
counterintuitive and have concluded that a sudden event must end
quickly. Both positions are based on the erroneous assumption that
"ending quickly" is the only possible temporal component of
"sudden."
In August 1989, the Georgia Supreme Court specifically ad-
dressed the temporality of the term "sudden" as used in exclusion
"f".26 In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court construed
the meaning of "sudden," determining that its primary definition is
"unexpected. ' 27 The court also acknowledged that "abrupt" is a
definition of "sudden" in some dictionaries, and a common use of
the word. The court then explained:
24 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31,
34 (6th Cir. 1988); C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F.
Supp. 265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 697 F.
Supp. 1314, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio
Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617, 621 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253, 260-61 (E.D. Pa.
1988); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
A particularly bold example of this position, frequently cited by insurers, is the fed-
eral district court's comment in Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 676 F. Supp.
1571, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 1987):
The word sudden was intended by the industry to have its usual temporal
meaning, and a reasonable insured with any degree of common sense
would assume the word to have that usual meaning. Only in the minds of
hypercreative lawyers could the word "sudden" be stripped of its essen-
tial temporal attributes. (citations omitted)
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the interpretation of exclusion "f" to the Geor-
gia Supreme Court, which rejected the position expressed in the district court's opinion.
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989). The
Georgia Supreme Court's rejection of the district court's position may dampen insurers'
enthusiasm for this particular quotation.
25 See, e.g., Broadwell Realty Serv. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 NJ. Super.
516, 530-31, 528 A.2d 76, 83 (App. Div. 1987).
26 Claussen, 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686. The plaintiff, Henry Claussen, owned
land that the City of Jacksonville, Florida had contracted to use as a landfill. For six
years, the city dumped industrial and chemical waste on the land and then returned the
land to Claussen. Following the return of the land, the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency brought a claim against Claussen. Claussen's insurer declined to provide
coverage on the ground that the discharge of waste had not been sudden and accidental.
27 Id. at 335.
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[O]n reflection one realizes that, even in its popular usage, "sud-
den" does not usually describe the duration of an event, but
rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the
road, sudden death. Even when used to describe the onset of an
event, the word has an elastic temporal connotation that varies
with expectations: Suddenly, it's spring.28
The court held that the commonly understood temporal element of
"sudden" is an abrupt or unexpected onset, not brevity.
While the Georgia Supreme Court's reasoning in Claussen is cer-
tainly not unprecedented, 29 it is perhaps the most explicit and
thoughtfully reasoned analysis of the temporal element of the word
''sudden" since exclusion "f" was inserted into the standard form
CGL policy. Claussen may well mark the beginning of an end to the
confusion on the temporality issue.
2. "Sudden" Is Not the Opposite of "Gradual". Eliminating a False
Dichotomy
Insurance companies frequently argue that "sudden" and
"gradual" are antonyms, so that a gradual release cannot be sud-
den.30 However, "sudden" and "gradual" are not always, or even
typically, mutually exclusive adjectives. The word "gradual" means
''arranged in grades or degrees,' ''proceeding by steps or degrees,"
and "moving, changing, or developing by fine, slight, or often im-
perceptible degrees." 3 1 Accordingly, "sudden" and "gradual" are
antonyms only when they are used to describe a process or progres-
sion, as in the sentence, "Hostility between the countries escalated
suddenly and not gradually." In this context, "sudden" describes
the rapidity of a process.
However, as discussed above, "sudden" is rarely used to de-
scribe a process. It is most commonly used to describe the unantici-
pated onset of an event or condition, as in a "sudden ambush" or a
"sudden turn in the road." 32 Thus, "sudden" and "gradual" can be
used together to describe distinct aspects of a single event, as when
28 Id.
29 The Claussen court's analysis was foreshadowed in several pre-1966 "accident"
cases in which courts defined accidents as "sudden, unexpected, unintended events"
and found incidents of varying duration to be accidents. See infra notes 51-52. A federal
district court in Massachusetts has also defined the temporal element of "sudden" in
terms of an abrupt onset. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. RTE Corp., Nos.85-2842-Y &
83-3882-Y, 1986 HAZARDOUS WASTE LIT. REP. 9,835, at 9,839 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 1986)
(transcript of bench order).
30 See G.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp.
265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989).
31 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 985 (1986).
"Gradual" comes from the Latin root meaning "step," or "degree."
32 See supra Section I(A).
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an event progresses gradually after its sudden onset. 33 For exam-
ple, a sudden illness may gradually worsen or subside. A sudden
fire may gradually spread or gradually abate. A release of pollut-
ants, like a fire, may have an abrupt and unexpected onset and,
therefore, be "sudden," and then progress or spread by im-
perceptible degrees, so that it could also be described as gradual.
Furthermore, it is important to note that exclusion "f" refers to
the release of pollutants, and not to events preceding or the damage
following a releaseA4 Thus, an abruptly beginning release caused
by the natural, progressive corrosion of an underground tank is a
sudden release.35 Similarly, a sudden release may cause gradual
property damage. In Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell,36 the court
recognized that a sudden release of pollutants may gradually perme-
ate the ground. In short, exclusion "f" refers to a release, not to its
cause or the ensuing property damage, and a sudden release may
progress gradually.
II
THE FUNCTION OF "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL": BUSINESS
AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES
A. An Insured's Reasonable Understanding of "Sudden and
Accidental" Coverage
Comprehensive general liability policies are designed to cover
almost any manner of liability arising in connection with the opera-
tion of a business. In purchasing CGL insurance, a business buys
security against unknown liabilities, paying in advance for protec-
tion that it may never need.3 7 Once the insured tenders its pre-
mium, it depends on the insurer to provide the agreed-upon
protection.38 If the insurer refuses to defend and indemnify its in-
sured against alleged liability, it may be too late for the insured to
obtain other insurance protection, since insurance companies gen-
erally insure risks, not liabilities. 39
33 See supra note 10. Courts that accept the sudden-gradual dichotomy have not
acknowledged that they have adopted a secondary rather than primary meaning for
"sudden." See C.L. Hauthaway, 712 F. Supp. at 268.
34 See supra text accompanying note 8 for the text of exclusion "f".
35 Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 477 N.E.2d 146,
review denied, 395 Mass. 1105, 482 N.E.2d 328 (1985); see also New Eng. Gas & Elec. Ass'n
v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 330 Mass. 640, 116 N.E.2d 671 (1953) (finding that
the undetected deterioration of a turbine over an eleven month period did not prevent
its eventual rupture from being characterized as "sudden").
36 414 A.2d 220, 224 (Me. 1980).
37 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 627-46 (student ed. 1988).
38 W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
3-11 (1975).
39 See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 37, at 592-94.
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The CGL form policy generally offered by domestic insurers is
a standard form drafted by the Insurance Services Office ("ISO")
and its predecessor organizations. 40 ISO is an insurance industry
trade association that, among other things, develops standard form
insurance policies and secures regulatory approval for their issuance
on behalf of its member or "subscriber" companies. 4 1 The insured,
dealing with a broker and not directly with an insurer, typically has
no input in drafting the terms of the contract. In some cases, an
insured does not even see the contract until after it has paid the
premium.42 Accordingly, where an insurance contract's terms are
susceptible to more than one interpretation, courts generally con-
strue policy language in accordance with the reasonable coverage
expectations of an insured.43
As previously noted, a business purchases CGL coverage
largely to protect against unexpected and unknown losses which
may threaten its financial survival. 44 An interpretation of "sudden
and accidental" that provides protection against abrupt, unexpected
pollution events, and excludes from coverage pollution events
which the insured expects or intends, is consistent with a reasonable
insured's business goals in purchasing CGL insurance.45
On the other hand, an insured typically would not expect liabil-
ity coverage to depend on the duration of an occurrence. Insurance
policies are classified by the types of risks being transferred to the
40 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
41 Currently, more than 1,400 companies participate in the ISO trade organization.
Virtually every major American insurance company that issues general liability insurance
uses or follows basic ISO form policy language.
42 Slawson, supra note 38, at 12.
43 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651, 477
N.E.2d 146, 149, review denied, 395 Mass. 1105, 482 N.E.2d 328 (1985); Farm Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (App. Div. 1978).
The principle of construing ambiguous provisions against an insurer should be dis-
tinguished from the doctrine of "reasonable expectations." A term or phrase may be
ambiguous because it is indefinitely expressed, has a double meaning, or is doubtful or
uncertain. Continental Casualty Co. v. Borthwick, 177 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965). Under the reasonable expectations doctrine, by contrast, a court will con-
strue a policy in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured, even if the
terms of the policy are not ambiguous. See R. KEETON & A. WIDIss, supra note 37, at
627-46; Kenneth S. Abraham,Judge-Made Law andJudge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Rea-
sonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981).
44 It contravenes public policy to insure against liability for intentional losses. See,
e.g., Industrial Sugars, Inc. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 338 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir.
1964); R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 37, at 518-24.
45 A specific exclusion for expected losses is also consistent with other types of
policies. For example, a standard fire insurance policy "general exclusion" excludes
damage caused by "[the insured's] neglect to use all reasonable means to save and pre-
serve property at and after a loss, or when property is endangered by a Peril Insured
Against." ISO Basic Form DP-1, Ed. 1-77.
1990]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
insurer, not on the duration of potential accidents. 46 Moreover, an
insured would not logically believe that its protection hinged on an
accident's duration, because such coverage would provide whimsical
protection instead of the business security sought by the CGL pur-
chaser. Just as one would not envision that coverage under a home-
owner's policy for damage from a burst pipe would depend on
whether the pipe burst when one happened to be home and could
quickly shut off the water, a business person with an underground
storage tank system would not expect insurance protection to be
available only if a tank tightness test happened to have been per-
formed within minutes after a release commenced, or if a tank hap-
pened to be nearly empty at the time a leak developed so that the
release would end quickly. Furthermore, unexpected, accidental re-
leases which continue undetected for a period of time often give rise
to the most catastrophic business liabilities, and thus constitute the
events against which an insured most needs and seeks protection.
It is also worth noting that the inclusion of the term "dispersal"
among the types of pollution events for which coverage is available
under the "sudden and accidental" exception would indicate to an
insured that coverage must include events that continue for a period
of time. A dispersal is "the process of spreading from one place to
another."'47 "Spread" means "to open or expand over a larger
area."' 48 A dispersal of pollutants requires some period of time dur-
ing which the pollutants expand over a large area. Accordingly, the
inclusion of the term "dispersal" among the list of pollution inci-
dents for which there is "sudden and accidental" coverage would
logically lead an insured to believe that quick termination is not re-
quired for an event to be sudden and accidental. 49
B. The Insurers' Reasonable Understanding of "Sudden and
Accidental" Coverage
1. The History of "Sudden and Accidental" as an Insurance Concept
Beginning in the 1940s, the basic provisions of CGL insurance
policies were drafted on an insurance industry-wide basis by two or-
ganizations working together. These organizations were the Na-
tional Bureau of Casualty Underwriters ("NBCU"), consisting of
employee-representatives of stock insurance companies, and the
46 R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 37, at 18-19; see also Robert N. Sayler & David
M. Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and The Intent of the CGL Drafters: The Effect of Living Back-
ward, Mealey 's Litigation Rep.-Insurance 4425, 4431 (1987).
47 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 365 (1988).
48 Id. at 1142.
49 See Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294
(App. Div. 1978) (discussing "dispersal" of pesticide spray onto neighboring lands).
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Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau ("MIRB"), consisting of employee-
representatives of mutual insurance companies.
Before 1966, CGL policies typically covered liability "caused by
accident." These policies are referred to as "accident" policies. A
typical accident policy contained an insuring agreement such as the
following:
[The insurer agrees with the insured] to pay on behalf of the In-
sured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property,
including loss of use thereof, caused by accident.50
The standard form "accident" policy did not define "accident."
An accident, within the meaning of an "accident" policy, came to be
defined by many courts as an "unintended, sudden, unexpected
event." 5 1 This definition did include ongoing events. 52 "Accident"
policies excluded risks an insured voluntarily assumed by contract
and damage that the insured expected 53 or intentionally incurred.
50 Moffat v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 238 F. Supp. 165, 167 (M.D. Pa.
1964) (emphasis added).
51 See, e.g., Geddes & Smith v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334
P.2d 881 (1959) (malfunctioning of defective doors which occurred over period of a few
days to six months constituted "sudden" accidents); Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
N.Y., 140 Cal. App. 2d 967, 972, 295 P.2d 154, 158 (App. Ct. 1956) (lint blown from
laundromat over time clogged drains in neighbor's gutters, causing water damage to
neighbor's premises which constituted "accident," defined by court as "a casualty-
something out of the usual course of events and which happens suddenly and unexpect-
edly and without any design of the person injured"); Taylor v. Imperial Casualty & In-
dem. Co., 82 S.D. 298, 302, 144 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1966) (unintended escape and
seepage of gasoline from underground storage tank constituted accident, defined as
"undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event").
52 Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949) (when oil blew
from well onto surrounding properties over a fifty hour period, damage was covered
under accident policy); Moffat, 238 F. Supp. 165 (liability resulting from long-term bum-
ing of coal mining wastes not excluded from accident policy); Employers Ins. Co. of Ala.
v. Rives, 264 Ala. 310, 87 So. 2d 653 (1955) (continuous act not exempt from classifica-
tion as accident because it extends for long period of time); White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d
497, 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) ("[tlhe accident mentioned in the policy need not be a
blow but may be a process," (quoting Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d
35, 38 (Ky. 1963)); McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172,
368 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975) (property damage taking place over course of several months
constituted an "accident"); Wolk v. Royal Indem. Co., 27 Misc. 2d 478, 210 N.Y.S.2d
677 (App. Term 1961) (harm resulting from construction of golf course may be "acci-
dental"); Lancaster Area Refuse Auth. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 437 Pa. 493, 263 A.2d
368 (1970) (harm caused by negligent landfill operation could be caused by accident
within meaning of insurance policy).
53 The majority ofjurisdictions that have addressed the meaning of "expected" in
the context of liability insurance have held that the term "expected" means a high de-
gree of certainty or probability. City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 604
F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Iowa law, court found that damage due to original
failure of city's pumps not "expected" even if reasonably foreseeable); Vanguard Ins.
Co. v. Cantrell, 18 Ariz. App. 486, 503 P.2d 962 (Ct. App. 1972) (insured robber's warn-
ing shot that struck store clerk not an "expected" harm); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v.
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In 1966, the "accident" policy was revised to cover the in-
sured's liability for injuries caused by an "occurrence" rather than
by "accident." 54 The text of a typical "occurrence" policy provided:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of (A) bodily injury or (B) property damage ... caused by an oc-
currence ....
"Occurrence" was defined as:
an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which re-
sults, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property dam-
age neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured.
The 1966 CGL revision served at least three purposes. First, it
explicitly recognized that coverage was provided for all accidents so
long as the insured did not expect or intend to cause damage. 55
Second, the 1966 form clarified that covered property damage must
be "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured" since a number of earlier court decisions had held that "acci-
dental" should be construed from the perspective of the injured
party.5 6 Finally, the phrase "neither expected nor intended" was
moved from an exclusion clause in the policy to a coverage provi-
sion, which allowed insurers to argue that the insured, not the insur-
ance company, had the burden of showing that it did not intend or
expect damage.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the public had become in-
creasingly aware that even legal industrial waste disposal practices
Medina, 29 Ill. App. 3d 224, 226, 329 N.E.2d 430, 432 (1975) (" 'expected' has been
judicially construed to mean a high degree of certainty"); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 892 (Me. 1981) (injury not "expected" unless actor "subjec-
tively foresaw [it] as practically certain"); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 190
Neb. 248, 252, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (1973) (the term "expected" carries a "high degree
of certainty"); Poston v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 320
N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1982) (insured's conviction for splashing gasoline on and burning
victim not sufficient to support summary judgment that he "expected or intended"
injury).
54 The 1966 occurrence policy form was drafted as ajoint project of the NBCU and
MIRB.
55 The industry-wide organizations drafting the standard-form CGL policy appar-
ently wished to confirm that coverage would be provided for ongoing events. It was
believed that these changes would standardize court coverage decisions and claims han-
dling procedures. See Norman Nachman, The New Poliy Provisions for General Liability In-
surance, 18 THE ANNALS 197, 199-200 (1965); Roland J. Wendorff, The New Standard
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Polity, 1965-1966 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGLIGENCE &
COMPENSATION LAw 250.
56 See, e.g., Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1949);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pioneer Seafoods Co., 116 F.2d 38, 40 (9th Cir. 1940); Moore
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 140 Cal. App. 2d 967, 972, 295 P.2d 154, 158 (App.
Ct. 1956); cf infra Section III(D).
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could result in serious environmental damage and present a health
threat.57 In 1970, the insurance drafting organizations resurrected
the pre-1966 "accident" concept in an effort to eliminate coverage
for damages caused by intentional discharges occurring in the ordi-
nary course of business. The drafting organizations began the pro-
cess of securing regulatory approval for what was to become the
standard form CGL policy exclusion "f".
2. Exclusion 'f" The Drafting and Regulatory Approval Process
In the late 1960s, the NBCU became known as the Insurance
Rating Board ("IRB"). The IRB, together with the MIRB, devel-
oped the standard form language of exclusion ,,f".5 8 The MIRB
and IRB operated through committees, which developed proposed
policy language. The members of the committees tended to be
composed of executive employees of larger insurance companies.
Many small and medium-sized companies not affiliated with a large
company also used the standard forms but did not participate in
drafting the forms and were largely unaware of the deliberations of
the committees responsible for drafting particular policy provisions.
However, MIRB and IRB member companies that did not partici-
pate in the drafting process periodically received circulars or bulle-
tins from the drafting organizations which informed them of the
status of the drafting process or requested input on various pro-
posed provisions. 59
In addition to drafting exclusion "f" and the other revisions to
the 1973 CGL policy form,60 the MIRB and IRB sought and ob-
tained regulatory approval of the revisions on behalf of their mem-
ber companies. As part of the regulatory approval process, the IRB
and MIRB submitted explanatory memoranda to state insurance
57 For example, in 1968, Japan's Chisso Corporation was forced to cease two de-
cades of discharges to Minimata Bay, a major fishing area, after the toxic outflows were
found responsible for causing a large number of severe deformities among the dense
local population. The first personal injury liability decisions were reached in the early
1970s, focusing international attention on the situation. See Bus. WK., June 27, 1977, at
38; Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1987, at A12; Reuters North European Servs., Sept. 6, 1982.
58 See Broadwell Realty Serv. v. Fidelity Guar. & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J.
Super. 516, 532-33, 528 A.2d 76, 84-85 (App. Div. 1987); Sayler & Zolensky, supra note
46.
59 In the early 1970s, the IRB and MIRB merged to form the Insurance Services
Office ("ISO"), which continues to revise and seek approval for standard policy provi-
sions. The ISO maintains records of the deliberations of its drafting committees, includ-
ing the views of individual members. The ISO's archives also contain numerous
bulletins, transcripts, speeches and other explanatory material compiled in the course of
developing policy changes.
60 In 1973, the definition of "occurrence" in the standard form CGL policy was
changed from "injurious exposure to conditions" in order to emphasize that coverage
was afforded for "continuous or repeated exposure to conditions."
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commissions in 1970. The standard explanatory memorandum on
exclusion "f" stated in pertinent part:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most
cases under present policies because the damages can be said to
be expected or intended and thus are excluded by the definition
of occurrence. The above exclusion clarifies this situation so as to
avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued for pollution
or contamination caused injuries when the pollution or contami-
nation results from an accident .... r1
This explanatory memorandum, ostensibly provided to assist
insurance commissioners in understanding the purpose and scope
of exclusion "f", was a paradigm of ambiguity. It correctly noted
that the definition of "occurrence" already excluded from coverage
damages that were expected or intended by the insuried. The mem-
orandum then stated that exclusion "f" was meant to clarify the fact
that expected or intended pollution-caused injuries were excluded
from coverage. This explanation seemed to ignore the fact that ex-
clusion "f" refers to releases of pollutants, and not to the damages
or injuries caused by such releases. 62
The IRB, MIRB and a number of their member companies sub-
mitted additional information and explanations in a number of
states at the request of the state insurance commissioners. The
most substantial record of the insurers' representations was com-
piled in West Virginia, where public hearings were held to deter-
mine whether exclusion "f" was "inconsistent, ambiguous or
misleading, or deceptively affect[ed] the risk purported to be as-
sumed in the general coverage of the contract, or if such forms
limit[ed] the overall insurance coverage to the extent that such cov-
erage [was] no longer sufficiently broad to be in the public inter-
61 Insurance Rating Board, Submission to Ins. Comm'r of W. Va. (May 18, 1970);
see also Insurance Rating Bd., Submission to Kansas Ins. Dep't (May 18, 1970); Mutual
Ins. Rating Bureau, Submission to Ins. Dep't of N.Y. (July 29, 1970); Insurance Rating
Bd., Submission to Ohio Ins. Dep't (May 8, 1970).
62 Agenda and Minutes of the Meeting of the General Liability Governing Commit-
tee of the Insurance Rating Bd. (Mar. 17, 1970). The MIRB memorandum appears to
use the words "pollution or contamination" to refer to a release or .discharge of pollu-
tants, rather than to the damage caused by the release, although the latter is the more
common meaning. If the words "release, dispersal, discharge or escape" had been sub-
stituted for the words "pollution or contamination" throughout the explanatory memo-
randum, it would accurately describe exclusion "f":
Coverage for releases, dispersals, discharges or escapes is not provided in
most cases because damages [resulting from the discharges, dispersal, re-
lease or escape] can be said to be expected or intended and are thus ex-
cluded by the definition of occurrence .... [Exclusion "f"] clarifies this
situation so as to avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued for
releases, dispersals, discharges or escapes that caused injuries when the release,
dispersal, discharge or escape results from an accident. (emphasis added)
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est." 63 At the West Virginia hearing, the MIRB maintained that
exclusion "f" was merely intended to clarify the term "occur-
rence." 64 Following the hearing, the West Virginia Insurance Com-
missioner approved exclusion "f" in a written order that explicitly
stated that the Insurance Commission had relied on the insurance
industry's representations that coverage would continue to be pro-
vided for unintended pollution. 65
The explanatory memorandum and the statements made to in-
surance commissions suggest that the insurance industry assumed
that environmental damage could be foreseen and thus presumed to
result from any discharge of pollutants. This assumption generated
a great deal of confusion in cases where an insured intentionally dis-
charged waste or chemical-containing material into soil or water but
with no intention or expectation that its actions would cause envi-
ronmental damage.
In summary, the intent of the drafters of exclusion "f" is far
from obvious. The explanation of the intended scope of the exclu-
sion provided by insurance companies is particularly murky with re-
spect to whether the industry intended exclusion "f" to apply to
unintentional releases or simply to unintentional damages. How-
ever, one fact emerges clearly from the drafting history of exclusion
"f": In 1973, when it was approved, both insurers and regulatory
officials focused on intent as the factor that would determine
whether coverage would be provided under exclusion "f".66 No
one suggested that exclusion "f" was drafted or approved in order
to limit coverage to accidental releases of short duration.67
63 Pollution and Contamination Exclusion Filings, Admin. Hearing n.70, W. Va. Ins.
Dep't (June 26, 1970) (Notice of Administrative Hearing).
64 Letter from the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau to the West Virginia Insurance
Department (July 30, 1970) [hereinafter "1970 Letter"]; Letter from the Mutual Insur-
ance Rating Board to the West Virginia Insurance Department (July 31, 1970).
65 The West Virginia Insurance Commissioner's order stated in pertinent part:
(1) The said companies and rating organizations have represented to
the Insurance Commissioner, orally and in writing, that the proposed ex-
clusions ... are merely clarifications of existing coverages as defined and
limited in the definition of the term "occurrence," contained in the re-
spective policies to which said exclusions would be attached;
(2) To the extent that said exclusions are mere clarifications of existing coverages,
the Insurance Commissioner finds that there is no objection to the ap-
proval of such exclusions....
In re Pollution and Contamination Exclusion Filings, W. Va. Ins. Dep't, Order, at 3 (Aug. 19,
1970) (emphasis added).
66 For a more complete description of exclusion "f" drafting history, see Sayler &
Zolensky, supra note 46; see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings
Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (App. Ct. 1989); Broadwell Realty
Serv. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76 (App. Div.
1987).
67 Because exclusion "f" was presented as essentially a clarification of existing pol-
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C. Regulatory Goals of Environmental Insurance
The public and regulatory objective of general liability insur-
ance is to transfer the risk of certain types of business-related losses
that could threaten insureds' viability. 68 In other words, from a
public and regulatory point of view, CGL insurance is designed to
promote business stability.
At the same time, the types of losses that insurance covers must
be limited so that insurance companies survive and can continue to
serve their function of providing economic stability to their in-
sureds. Generally, the limitations on insurance coverage fall into
two categories: expected losses and intentional losses. Expected
losses frequently are not covered by insurance because they are
more like business expenses than true risks; these losses can be pre-
dicted and calculated in the course of responsible business planning
efforts. Intentional losses also are not true risks because the insured
has the ability to avoid them. Furthermore, public policy forbids the
transfer of liability for certain intentional losses.69
An interpretation of exclusion "f" which provides coverage for
unanticipated and unintended releases of pollutants is consistent
with well-settled insurance risk transfer principles and the twin goals
of encouraging responsible business practices and providing busi-
ness stability. Thus, it is not surprising that the adoption of exclu-
sion "f" was promoted by the insurance industry, the regulatory
community, the public, and was even legislatively mandated by the
State of New York. 70
icy coverage, rather than as a coverage reduction, no reduction in premium rates was
required.
68 R. KEETON & A. WIDiss, supra note 37, at 1-14.
69 Id. at 8-10, 518-45.
70 A 1971 New York amendment required policies issued to commercial or indus-
trial enterprises to contain the standard form "Contamination or Pollution Exclusion."
N.Y. INs. LAw § 46(13)-(14) (McKinney 1972). In Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co.,
80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981), the court reviewed the legislative
history of New York's law requiring the inclusion of exclusion "f", noting:
[The addition of subdivisions 13 and 14 to section 46 of the Insurance
Law was calculated to buttress New York's strict environmental protec-
tion standards. These standards could be undermined if commercial en-
terprises were able to purchase insurance to protect themselves from
liability arising from their pollution of the environment. "For example, a
polluting corporation might continue to pollute the environment if it
could buy protection from potential liability for only the small cost of an
annual insurance premium, whereas, it might stop polluting, if it had to
risk bearing itself the full penalty for violating the law."
Niagara County, 80 A.D.2d at 418, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (quoting New York Legis. Ann.
353-54 (1971)); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 487-88, 426
N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (1980).
Similarly, the MIRB stated to the West Virginia Insurance Commission that "[i]t is
in the public interest that willful pollution of any type be stopped in order to protect the
ecological balance." 1970 Letter, supra note 64.
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Conversely, interpreting exclusion "f" to exclude coverage for
unexpected and unintentional releases that do not end quickly or
instantaneously would not serve either regulatory or public policy
goals. 71 Such insurance would not provide business stability be-
cause an insured could not effectively transfer the risk of unknown
potential liabilities if coverage were dependent on the chance imme-
diate discovery or brevity of a release. Moreover, as previously
noted, the undetected continuing releases are often the most eco-
nomically destabilizing. It is against these events that the insured
needs greatest protection.
Finally, an interpretation of exclusion "f" which excludes cov-
erage for unexpected and unintentional releases that are not short-
lived does not serve any social purpose. Coverage would be pro-
vided randomly. Furthermore, if coverage is limited to instantane-
ous events, responsible companies who become liable for
environmental incidents they did not expect or intend may be
driven into bankruptcy. This would remove responsible businesses
from the market and saddle taxpayers with the cleanup costs. 72
D. Clearing Muddy Waters
Understanding the genesis of the insurance industry's use of
the phrase "sudden and accidental" and the history of the drafting
and approval of exclusion "f" helps to clarify and place in context
three coverage controversies. They are: (1) the relationship be-
tween "sudden" and "accidental"; (2) the relationship between ex-
clusion "f" and the definition of "occurrence"; and (3) the
relationship between coverage provided by the CGL policy and that
provided by environmental impairment liability policies.
71 The evolution of environmental regulations makes quite clear that some transfer
of risk serves the public's best interest. For example, the EPA issued regulations in 1982
requiring treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to carry insurance or some other
means of responding to potential liability. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9608 (West 1989). In the 1988
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, RCRA Subtitle I
§ 9003(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(6), Congress mandated that owners and operators of
underground storage tanks be required to demonstrate the financial ability to undertake
corrective action and compensate third parties for inquiries in the event of release of
hazardous substances or petroleum. In 1989, the EPA issued financial responsibility
requirement regulations governing owners and operators of petroleum underground
storage tanks. 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.90-280.112 (1989). The EPA has explicitly recognized
that most owners and operators will need to rely on insurance to meet their regulatory
obligations. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,325 (Oct. 26, 1988).
72 Some commentators have theorized that the unavailability of coverage may even
provide a disincentive for a firm to act in an environmentally responsible fashion. See,
e.g., Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example
of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 602 (1983) (authored by
Palma J. Strand). ("A corporation will be indifferent between enormous liability and
lesser liability if both would bankrupt it." (emphasis in original)).
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1. The Relationship Between "Sudden" and "Accidental'"
Insurance companies frequently contend that "sudden" must
be defined as "instantaneous" because otherwise "sudden" would
be synonymous with or subsumed by the term "accidental. '73 How-
ever, this argument fails to acknowledge the history of the use of the
word "sudden" in connection with general liability policies. For
forty years before the development of exclusion 'T", "sudden" was
used by courts to define and describe covered "accidents." 74 Ac-
cordingly, the insurance industry was well aware that "sudden"
could be encompassed by "accidental." Moreover, when exclusion
-f" was adopted, there was substantial case law describing events of
varying duration as "sudden accidents." 75
The argument that contract principles require separate and dis-
crete meanings for "sudden" and "accidental" also disregards the
fact that "sudden" and "accidental" work together as a phrase. As
discussed in Section I, the phrase "sudden and accidental" suggests
that a covered release must be "unexpected," a meaning which is
not essential to a definition of either the word "accidental" or the
word "sudden." 76 The phrase "sudden and accidental" in exclusion
"f" is grammatically parallel to the "neither expected nor intended"
phrase in the definition of "occurrence," suggesting that the limita-
tion on releases of pollutants in the former parallels the limitation
on damages in the latter. Courts considering the definition of "oc-
currence" have generally construed "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured" without dissecting the phrase.
Rather than analyzing each element of the phrase to ensure that the
terms "intended" and "expected" have fully distinct functions,
courts have concentrated on determining whether the insured's con-
duct fell within the overall purpose of the clause. 77 Nothing about
73 See, e.g., Becker Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. Granite State Ins. Co., No. 86-CV-1294
(N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1989); C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
712 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989).
74 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. Boiler and machinery insurance
policies also explicitly cover accidents defined as "sudden and accidental" breaking of
machinery. Courts have recognized that boiler and machinery coverage depends on the
unexpectedness of the breakdown, not how long it took. See, e.g., New Eng. Gas & Elec.
Ass'n v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 330 Mass. 640, 116 N.E.2d 671 (1953).
75 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
76 See supra Section I.
77 Several courts have found no meaningful difference between the terms "ex-
pected" and "intended" in the definition of occurrence. See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d
285, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313, 317, 404 A.2d
101 (1979); Poston v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 221, 320
N.W.2d 9, 12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982); see also Annot., Construction and Application of Provision
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exclusion "f" warrants a different approach. 78
2. The Relationship Between Exclusion 'f'" and "Occurrence"
As noted above, exclusion "f" focuses on whether a release of
pollutants is unexpected and unintended, whereas the definition of
"occurrence" focuses on whether property damage is unexpected
and unintended. 79 By limiting coverage to sudden and accidental
releases, the insurance industry eliminated coverage for intentional
releases of pollutants that were not intended to cause harm. Exam-
ples of "occurrences" that would be excluded from coverage by ex-
clusion "f" include discharges of partially treated chemicals into
waterways, underground injection wells used by insureds for waste
disposal in accordance with applicable laws, and unsecured land dis-
posal. When defined to require an abruptly beginning, unexpected,
and unintended release, the "sudden and accidental" exception to
exclusion "f" eliminates intentional or expected releases from in-
surance coverage, whether or not the insured expects bodily injury
or property damage to result. This constitutes a significant limita-
tion on the scope of coverage for pollution occurrences.
3. Sudden and "Non-Sudden" Insurance
Insurance companies have argued that "sudden and accidental"
coverage must be limited to instantaneous events because ongoing
events can be covered by the "non-sudden" insurance offered in an
environmental impairment liability ("EIL") policy. At the time that
the "sudden and accidental" language was drafted, however, the
EIL policy had not yet been developed and the concept of a "non-
sudden" release did not exist. In fact, there was no such word as
"non-sudden" 80 until the insurance industry coined the term in
1974 when EIL insurance was introduced. 81 EIL coverage did not
become generally available until 1982, and even then such policies
of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31
A.L.R.4th 957 § 4[a].
78 Indeed, the pollution exclusion is full of words that have supportive, overlapping
meanings. See "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape"; "smoke, vapors .... fumes,....
or gases"; and "irritants, contaminants, or pollutants" in text accompanying note 8,
supra.
79 See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text; see also Claussen v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989) (holding that the pollution exclusion
clause of a comprehensive general liability policy did not preclude coverage for contami-
nation caused by discharge of pollutants over extended period of time).
80 None of the dictionaries cited supra note I 1 list "non-sudden" as a word.
81 The claims-made EIL form was introduced to insurance commissions in 1982 as
a type of policy that would enable insurers to charge premiums that were in line with
their then current estimated environmental losses.
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did not define "non-sudden."8 2
The EIL policy is designed specifically to transfer the risk of
losses relating to pollution, but the scope of coverage available
under the EIL policy is much more limited than that provided by a
CGL policy. The EIL is a "claims-made" policy which provides in-
surance only for third party claims brought against the insured dur-
ing the policy period. 83 In contrast, the CGL occurrence-based
policy protects the insured against liability for bodily injury or prop-
erty damage occurring during the policy period regardless of when
claims are brought.
In 1980, shortly after the development of the EIL policy, and
concurrent with its becoming widely available, ISO proposed that
the sudden and accidental exception to exclusion "f" be removed
and exclusion "f" reworded so as to exclude all pollution-related
liability. Insurance commissioners were informed that companies
seeking pollution liability coverage would be offered a companion
EIL policy that covered both sudden and non-sudden releases. 84
Neither the policy nor ISO defined "sudden" or "non-sudden."
Thus, the EIL policy was designed to provide insurance protec-
tion for environmental losses and to obviate the need for insurance
companies to provide coverage under future CGL policies. Addi-
tionally, in some instances EIL policies relieved the loss potential of
previously issued CGL policies by providing overlapping coverage
for claims brought against the insured during an EIL period for
property damage that had occurred during a previous CGL period.
Perhaps the insurance industry did not intend the EIL policy to re-
vise the scope of protection given in previously issued CGL policies.
However, it quickly became insurance industry practice to refer to
ongoing releases as gradual and "non-sudden," implying that sud-
den losses could not be ongoing.8 5
82 In 1976, Congress enacted RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 which empowered
EPA to issue regulations requiring "proof of financial responsibility" as a condition of
granting permits to land disposal facilities. After extensive consultation with the insur-
ance industry, EPA issued regulations requiring proof of coverage for sudden and non-
sudden releases from owners and operators of landfills and surface impoundments. 40
C.F.R. § 264.147 (1988).
83 See standard form EIL Policy, ISO Form GL 00 29 (Ed.Jan. 1983) (text of earlier
version of policy quoted supra text accompanying note 8).
84 See ISO Circular CML-81-142 (August 17, 1981).
85 By 1988, the vast majority of insurance companies that had been writing EIL
coverage had either ceased doing so or were writing coverage in only a few states. As of
July 1989, only seven companies continued to write such coverage. JEFFREY L. LEITER,
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS (1988 & Supp. 1989). The lack of available environmen-
tal impairment coverage prompted the EPA to postpone the effective date of its 1988
regulatory requirement that underground storage tank owners and operators demon-
strate their financial ability to sustain a one million dollar environmental loss, as most
small and medium sized companies or dealers depend on insurance to provide such
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In summary, the development of the EIL policy and the coining
of the word "non-sudden" were part of an insurance industry effort
to develop a policy that would provide environmental protection on
a more confined and calculable basis than the prospective coverage
offered under the occurrence-based CGL policies. The EIL policy
legitimately serves two purposes: First, it may assume some of the
burden from the CGL policy to cover an entire loss where overlap-
ping coverage exists; second, it provides the sole protection avail-
able for property damage occurring after 1985, when the absolute
pollution exclusion was inserted into standard form CGL policies.
Clearly, the insurance industry has the right to develop new policies
and, with regulatory approval, to revise policy forms that are not
profitable. However, the language in EIL policies developed by the
insurance industry drafting organization in the 1980s should not be
used to re-interpret the "sudden and accidental" exception to exclu-
sion "f" which was written, approved and, in many cases, sold al-
most a decade before.
III
INTERPRETATIONS OF "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL": THE
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF EXCLUSION "F"
In the decade following the introduction of exclusion "f" into
the standard form CGL policy, courts unanimously held that unex-
pected, unintended, abruptly beginning releases were "sudden and
accidental" within the meaning of exclusion "f". The reasoning
that supported the early decisions was not always well articulated,
however, and, beginning in 1982, a few courts began to merge the
"sudden and accidental" limitation on releases in exclusion "f'" with
the "neither expected nor intended" limitation on damage found in
the definition of "occurrence." The trend culminated in several de-
cisions which held that exclusion "f" simply restated the damage
limitation contained in the definition of "occurrence."
This expansive reading was followed by a judicial backlash be-
ginning in late 1983 in which a number of courts held that the "sud-
den and accidental" exception to exclusion "f" restricted coverage
to instantaneous events. As the law grew more uncertain, a few
courts sought an "objective" meaning of "sudden" by resorting to a
"point-of-view" analysis that had been widely rejected a century
ago. This Section summarizes the critical exclusion "f" decisions
from 1975 to the present to provide an understanding of the evolu-
protection. Many states have been forced to create their own funds, supported by gaso-
line taxes, to provide an alternative where insurance remains unavailable. Id. § 700, 65-
71.
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tion of insurers' and insureds' positions, and to suggest a coherent
path for future interpretation.
A. The Lansco Line of Cases: "Sudden and Accidental" Means
"Unexpected and Unintended"
In 1975, Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection86
first addressed the applicability of exclusion "f". Lansco sued its
insurers in connection with its liability for the cleanup of an oil spill
caused by vandals who opened an above-ground oil storage tank
valve, allowing 14,000 gallons of oil to flow onto Lansco's property
and into the Hackensack River. Lansco's comprehensive general lia-
bility insurer denied coverage, claiming that "the occurrence was
neither sudden nor accidental within the meaning of the exclusion
[,f,]."8 7 In interpreting exclusion "f", the court noted that the dic-
tionary defines "sudden" as "happening without previous notice or
on very brief notice; unforeseen; unexpected; unprepared for," and
"accidental" as "happening unexpectedly or by chance; taking place
not according to usual course." 88 The court found that Lansco did
not expect or intend the release, and thus found it to be sudden and
accidental.
The Lansco court's interpretation of exclusion "f" focused on
whether an event which was not accidental from the perspective of
the vandals could be covered as "sudden and accidental."8 9 Be-
cause exclusion "f" does not address the point of view issue, the
court examined the definition of "occurrence" which, like exclusion
'f", uses the "accident" concept. The definition of "occurrence"
explicitly refers to the insured's point of view, and the court there-
fore applied the same perspective to exclusion "f". Since the re-
lease was "sudden and accidental" from Lansco's perspective,
coverage was afforded.
It is worth noting that the Lansco court did not equate the defi-
nition of "occurrence" with exclusion "f". Indeed, the court's con-
clusion that the oil spill was not expected by Lansco indicates that
the court focused on whether the release was unexpected and unin-
tended by Lansco, and not simply on whether the ensuing damage
met the definition of "occurrence." 90
Two years later, in Aronson Associates v. Pennsylvania Mutual Na-
86 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 145 NJ. Super. 433,
368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 NJ. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
87 Id. at 281, 350 A.2d at 523.
88 Id. at 282, 350 A.2d at 524.
89 Id., 350 A.2d at 524.
90 Id., 350 A.2d at 524.
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tional Casualty Insurance Co. ,91 a Pennsylvania court addressed exclu-
sion "f" in the context of an insured's liability for the eighteen-day
seepage of fuel from an underground pipe that had cracked during
unusually cold weather. The court defined "accident" as an "occur-
rence ... which proceeds from an unknown cause or which is the
unusual effect of a known cause and hence unexpected and unfore-
seen."' 92 While noting that the release continued undetected for a
period of time, the court concluded that the cracking of the under-
ground pipe was a sudden event within the ordinary meaning of the
term and constituted an accident.93 The court clearly focused on
the "sudden and accidental" nature of the release, and not simply
on the resulting damage.
In 1978, in Farm Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bagley,94 a New
York appellate court interpreted the scope of exclusion "f" in the
context of an insured's liability for damage caused by a pesticide
product that the insured had intentionally sprayed on his crops but
which had accidentally dispersed onto neighboring vineyards. As in
Lansco and Aronson, the court defined "sudden" as unexpected and
"accidental" as unusual or unintentional. The court distinguished
the insured's intentional discharge onto his own land from the un-
expected, unusual, and unforeseen dispersal of the pesticide by high
winds onto the neighbor's land. Although the initial discharge of
pesticides had been intentional, the insurer's motion for summary
judgment was denied because the dispersal onto neighboring lands
could have been sudden and accidental. 95
Five additional cases addressed the issue in 1980 and 1981: All-
state Insurance Co. v. Klock Oil Co. ,96 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell,97
91 99 Dauph. 446, 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (Ct. C.P. 1977), a2fd, 272 Pa. Super. 606, 422
A.2d 689 (Super. Ct. 1979).
92 Id. at 451, 14 Pa. D. & C.3d at 8 (quoting Morelli v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
31 Pa. D. & C.2d 424, 426 (1963)).
93 Id., 14 Pa. D. & C.3d at 8.
94 64 A.D.2d 214, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (App. Div. 1978).
95 The court noted that the insured did not intend to disperse pesticides so as to
cause damage to the neighbor's land. Id., 409 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
96 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1980). The insured was sued by
adjacent landowners for gasoline contamination alleged to be emanating from its
underground storage tank. Allstate disclaimed coverage on the ground that the alleged
gasoline release was not "sudden and accidental." The court noted that exclusion "'
reflected New York's public policy of encouraging a cleaner environment by eliminating
the opportunity for industry to insure against pollution-based liability. Id. at 487-88,
426 N.Y.S.2d at 604. Additionally, the court found that an allegation of negligent
installation or maintenance of an underground storage tank would not preclude
coverage where the escape of gasoline was neither expected nor intended. The court
explicitly noted that a release could be sudden and accidental although undetected for a
substantial period of time. Id. at 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
97 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980). The insured was sued in a declaratory judgment
action by three of its CGL insurers in connection with allegations by local residents that
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Evans v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,98 Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security
Insurance Group,99 and Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. 100
With the exception of Niagara County, each case's analysis of exclu-
sion "f" centered on whether there was an unintended and unantici-
pated release.
In Niagara County, the court noted that state law required the
inclusion of exclusion "f" in all commercial and industrial liability
policies, and examined the legislative purpose underlying the rule.
The court concluded that exclusion "f" was designed to exclude
coverage only for "actual polluters."'' As a practical matter, the
reasoning of Niagara County is generally consistent with that of the
other cases because "actual polluters" are insureds who intention-
ally release pollutants. Insureds who do not expect or intend to re-
lease pollutants would be covered by the "sudden and accidental"
exception under either the Lansco or Niagara County standards.
Dingwell's reckless storage or disposal of hazardous substances had contaminated their
wells.
The court found that the underlying complaint obligated Dingwell's insurers to
defend because "[t]he class action plaintiffs, at this point, have no way of knowing how
the toxic wastes entered the ground. There may have been either intentional dumping
or burial or unintentional spills, leaks, or other accidents." Id. at 224-25. Although the
court noted that "sudden and accidental" was not necessarily synonymous with
"unexpected and unintended," it did not articulate any distinction. The court
emphasized that a sudden release could result in gradual permeation of the ground and
water table, stating that exclusion "f' limits coverage to "sudden and accidental"
releases, but does not require that all of the damage resulting from the release occur
instantaneously. Id.
98 107 Misc. 2d 710, 435 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1981). The plaintiff sued its in-
surer after being held strictly liable for a release of gasoline from its tank farm. The
release occurred after vandals broke a lock and opened a valve on a storage tank, releas-
ing more than 18,000 gallons into the ground. Without much explanation, the court
held that the release was sudden and accidental, relying on Klock Oil, 73 A.D.2d at 488,
426 N.Y.S.2d at 604. Evans, 107 Misc. 2d at 113, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
9 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). Barmet was the first case to hold that an
insured's release did not fall within the "sudden and accidental" exception to exclusion
"f". Barmet was sued for a highway fatality caused by a gas cloud which had escaped
from Barmet's plant and settled over the road, obscuring visibility. The court noted
that, although the malfunctioning of Barmet's pollution control system and the escape
of the gas may not have been intended, it occurred on a regular and frequent basis and
could not be considered unexpected. Id. at 203.
100 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981), appeal dismissed, 54 N.Y.2d
608, 427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981). Niagara County was an action brought
in connection with the Love Canal litigation by the municipality that had purchased land
on which Hooker Chemical Company had dumped its waste. The court found that ex-
clusion "f" did not bar coverage for the municipality because the municipality had not
caused the pollution and the exclusion was intended to discourage "active polluters."
101 Id. at 418, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
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B. TheJackson Township Gloss: Equating "Sudden and
Accidental" Releases with "Unexpected and
Unintended" Damages
In 1982, in Jackson Township Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co.,10 2 the New Jersey Superior Court went
beyond previous case law and found that exclusion "f" was simply a
restatement of the definition of "occurrence" and, therefore, any
event which resulted in unexpected and unintended damages would
be covered. 10 3 The court found that the disposal of waste at the
township's landfill, from which chemicals escaped into the ground,
was sudden and accidental because the ensuing damages were unex-
pected and unintended. The court relied on a comment by insur-
ance scholar Rowland Long written the year exclusion "f" was
introduced, 10 4 and interpreted the Klock, Bagley, Niagara County, and
Barmet decisions to support the proposition that exclusion "f"
would bar coverage only if the damages resulting from an event
were expected or intended. 0 5
Although the Jackson Township court's interpretation of exclu-
sion "f" as a mere clarification of the definition of "occurrence"
comports with the explanation of exclusion "f" first offered by the
insurance industry, it is not the most logical reading of the policy
language. The court could have reached the same result by follow-
ing Lansco and determining that there had been a sudden and acci-
dental (i.e., unexpected and unintended) release or dispersal of
pollutants from the landfill into the surrounding environment.
In the two years following Jackson Township, several courts fol-
lowed its example, holding that exclusion "f" precluded coverage
only where pollution damages (as opposed to releases) were in-
tended or expected by the insured. 10 6 Other courts continued to
follow the rationale of Lansco, basing coverage decisions on whether
the insured expected or intended the alleged discharge. 10 7
102 186 NJ. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (Law Div. 1982).
103 Id. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994.
104 In 3 ROWLAND LONG, LAW OF LIABILrrY INSURANCE App. 58 (1973) Long wrote:
"Exclusion (f) is new. It eliminates coverage for damages arising out of pollution or
contamination, where such damages appear to be expected or intended on the part of
the insured and hence are excluded by the definition of occurrence."
105 Jackson Township, 186 NJ. Super. at 160-66, 451 A.2d at 992-95.
106 See Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1977); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336
N.W.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1983).
107 See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d
30 (Ist Cir. 1984); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549
(E.D. Mich. 1984); CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 NJ. Super. 558, 489
A.2d 1265 (Law Div. 1984); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co.,
17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1984).
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Commentators believed that Jackson Township sounded a death
knell for exclusion "f".10 8 However, the expansive reading of cov-
erage afforded by that opinion and its strained characterization of
preceding decisions instead prompted a backlash. Courts rejecting
the proposition that exclusion "f" simply repeated the limitations
already imposed by the term "occurrence" now began to rule that
exclusion "f" was far more restrictive than any court, commentator,
or the insurance industry itself had suggested when exclusion "f"
was introduced into the standard policy.
C. The Peerless Backlash: Constricting the Meaning of "Sudden
and Accidental"
In 1985, with courts already divided between those that con-
strued exclusion "f" to preclude coverage for all expected or in-
tended releases and those that interpreted exclusion "f" to be no
more limiting than the definition of "occurrence," a new fault line
appeared in the case law. In Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.,109
a Pennsylvania court suggested that duration was relevant to
whether a release of pollutants was sudden and accidental.
When chemicals used by Techalloy were discovered in local
wells, residents sued the company, alleging that it recklessly
dumped or stored its chemicals. Techalloy's insurer, Reliance, de-
nied coverage on the ground that the suit did not allege a sudden
and accidental discharge, and refused to defend Techalloy. Techal-
loy successfully defended itself against the local residents, and then
sued Reliance to recover its defense costs. 1 0
In granting Reliance's motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that:
[a]t best, Techalloy could prove that the discharge was accidental.
That alone, however, would not substantiate [its] position since
the language of the policy unambiguously states that there will be
no coverage for toxic discharge into the environment unless that
discharge is both sudden and accidental .... [T]he allegations
were directly the opposite, identifying the source of the problem
as contamination which occurred on a "regular or sporadic basis
from time to time during the past 25 years."' 1
Although the court's conclusion that releases occurring over several
years could not have been sudden might have rested on a belief that
108 See, e.g., Michael Rodburg & Robert Chester, Beyond The Pollution Exclusion: Emerg-
ing Parameters of Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability, 10 CHEM. WASTE LIT. REP. 30, 32
(1985).
109 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820 (Super. Ct. 1984).
110 Id. at 5, 487 A.2d at 822-23.
111 Id. at 13, 487 A.2d at 826-27 (emphasis in original).
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the ongoing releases were anticipated by Techalloy, the factual rec-
ord before the court suggests that the court interpreted "sudden"
to require an event of short duration.
The insured's failure to present the existing precedent pertain-
ing to exclusion "f" may partly account for the court's divergence
from a more straightforward analysis in Techalloy. The court noted
that Techalloy had addressed the pollution exclusion only by citing
a footnote in a non-environmental pollution case involving expo-
sure by the insured's employee to toxic substances in the course of
his employment. 1 2 The court further noted that Techalloy had not
offered any interpretation of "sudden and accidental" which would
render it ambiguous and capable of interpretation in favor of the
insured. "13
No reported decision followed the Techalloy decision in 1985.114
In 1986, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
exclusion "f" barred coverage for events that were not instantane-
ous, based on a rationale that would become one of the insurance
companies' major exclusion "f" arguments through the end of the
1980s. In Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance
Co., 115 the insured, a waste hauler, was alleged to be liable for dam-
age that occurred after wastes it had transported to a landfill es-
caped into the environment. The court recognized that the
"occurrence" on which the coverage dispute focused was not the
routine dumping but the unintended, unexpected leaching of con-
taminants from the landfill into the groundwater." 16 The court also
stated that an "occurrence" could be either an unexpected and un-
intended event or an intentional event which resulted in unexpected
and unintended damages." t 7 However, the court then contradicted
112 Id. at 15, 487 A.2d at 826. Techalloy cited C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1981) (court unable to determine from the
complaint whether an alleged discharge was accidental, and therefore refused to grant
the insurers' motion for summary judgment).
113 Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 15, 487 A.2d at 827.
114 The decisions in Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189,
(S.D. Fla. 1985), and United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164
(Ala. 1985) followed the established construction that coverage would be afforded for
unexpected and unintended releases or discharges.
115 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
116 Id. at 696, 340 S.E.2d at 380.
117 Id. at 695, 340 S.E.2d at 379. For example, if a person with homeowner's insur-
ance intentionally throws a baseball and breaks a window, the court will look to whether
the insured intended to break the window in determining coverage. If that insured
lights his curtains on fire and his house burns down, however, the court will assume
from the nature of the act that damage was expected. Compare Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Abernathy, 391 Mass. 81, 469 N.E.2d 797 (1984) (although policyholder intended to
throw projectile, coverage is not precluded when resulting damage to car passenger was
unintended) with Newton v. Krasnigor, 404 Mass. 682, 687-88, 536 N.E.2d 1079, 1082
(1989) (deliberate setting of fire by insured with intent to cause some damage, but not
1990] 639
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
its statement that an intentional event which resulted in unexpected
damages could be an "occurrence," and instead asserted that "oc-
currence relates to ... whether or not [an event] was intentional or
expected."' "18 This inconsistency led the court to conclude that, to
avoid redundancy, a "sudden and accidental" release must be in-
stantaneous." 9 The court's misconstruction of "occurrence," and
its resulting conclusion that "sudden and accidental" means instan-
taneous, provided a legal foothold for the insurers' argument that
sudden events must end quickly.
D. Stirring Muddy Waters: The Reemergence of the "Point-of-
View" Debate
Following Peerless, courts have completely broken ranks. From
1986 on, a number of courts (often upon the invitation of insureds
or insurers) have incorrectly cited and mischaracterized the hold-
ings and reasonings of the over one hundred decisions that have
interpreted exclusion "f". Insureds and insurers have selected
freely from the array of decisions to find support for their chosen
positions, often driving courts to seek shelter in what they perceive
to be a "majority view" or "recent trend." Recently, some insurers
have taken advantage of the confused state of the case law to reopen
the argument that coverage should be based upon the knowledge
and conduct of persons not related to the insured. 20
As previously noted, under CERCLA and most state environ-
mental liability statutes, an insured can be held liable for environ-
mental damage that occurs at a location remote from the insured's
property or which results from activities or conditions beyond the
insured's control or knowledge.' 2 ' An insured may be held liable
under CERCLA for damage to a location to which the insured did
not even know its waste had been taken.' 22 In cases such as these,
some insurers have argued that if anyone expected or intended to
release the pollutants for which the insured is seeking liability pro-
tection, including vandals or other persons over whom the insured
has no control, exclusion "f" bars coverage. 123
necessarily the specific damage that actually resulted, bars coverage under the occur-
rence definition).
118 Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. at 699, 340 S.E.2d at 382.
119 Id., 340 S.E.2d at 382.
120 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lansco.
121 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 88-5207 (Mass. Super. Ct.,
summary judgment motion filed Mar. 24, 1989) (insured allegedly liable for damage to
environment in towns to which its waste was illegally shipped without insured's consent
and contrary to disposal receipts given to insured by disposer).
123 See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.
Pa. 1988); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342
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In Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 124 the insured dis-
covered hazardous materials that had been buried on its land years
earlier by a former landowner.' 25 Powers Chemco thereafter en-
tered a consent decree with the New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation and agreed to clean up the property.
Powers Chemco's insurer took the position that the discharges were
not sudden and accidental because the former owner had intended
to bury the waste on the property. The Court of Appeals of New
York agreed, upholding the Appellate Division opinion which
stated: "The relevant factor is not whether the policyholders antici-
pated or intended the resultant injury or damage, but whether the
toxic material was discharged into the environment unexpectedly
and unintentionally or knowingly and intentionally."' 126
Holding that an insured's protection could be eliminated by the
intentional activities of an unrelated third party runs contrary to
eighty years of insurance case law. 127 As early as 1891, courts re-
jected arguments that policies for injuries caused by "accident" or
"accidental means" do not cover damage caused by unrelated third
parties' intentional actions. For example, in Ripley v. Railroad Co. 128
the court rejected an insurer's claim that no "accident" had oc-
curred when the insured was intentionally attacked and killed by
highwaymen. The court noted:
Perhaps, in a strict sense, any event which is brought about by
design of any person is not an accident, because that which has
accomplished the intention was not strictly an accident. Yet I am
persuaded this contract should not be interpreted so as thus to
limit its meaning; for the event took place unexpectedly, and with-
out design on [the insured's] part. It was to him a casualty, and in
the more popular and common acceptation, [an] "accident." 129
(E.D. Pa. 1987); and Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 445, 533
N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1988).
124 144 A.D.2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1988), afd, 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548
N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989).
125 144 A.D.2d at 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
126 144 A.D.2d at 446, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 1101 (quoting Technicon Elec. Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 144, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 103-04 (App.
Div. 1988)).
127 Although the Powers Chemco decision appears to severely limit coverage where a
party other than the insured is aware of activities leading to a pollution event, the
breadth of the Powers Chemco decision is uncertain. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir.
1989), reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1990), held that an insured that sent its waste to
a Superfund site would not be denied coverage under exclusion "f". The court stated
that it did not believe that New York's highest court would bar coverage to insureds who
had disposed of their waste lawfully. See also Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 673 (citing cases).
128 (W.D.. Mich. 1870), reprinted in 2 Bigelow, Reports of the Life &Accident Insurance
Cases, 738 (1872).
129 Id.; see also Richards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 26 P. 762 (1891) (rejecting
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Nothing in the history of the CGL policy indicates that the in-
surance industry intended to make a dramatic break with traditional
insurance principles when exclusion "f" was adopted. In the pre-
1966 "accident" policies, some courts had found the term "acci-
dent" to be ambiguous and construed the term from the point of
view of the victim or third-party claimant,13 0 but no courts sug-
gested interpreting the event from an unrelated third party's per-
spective where an insured was alleged to be strictly liable for a third
party's misconduct. The CGL policy language was revised by the
insurance industry in 1966 to establish that accidents were to be
construed from the insured's point of view. In proposing exclusion
"f", the insurance industry's drafting organization stated that the
exclusion clarified the scope of coverage provided in the former ver-
sion of the policy. 13'
Moreover, the revised policy itself does not suggest that exclu-
sion "f" should be construed from a point of view different from
that applied to its other provisions. The definition of "occurrence"
contained in the standard form CGL policy expressly states that
damage resulting from an "accident" is to be viewed from the in-
sured's standpoint.' 32 Exclusion "f" repeats the word "accident" in
its adjectival form. There is no indication that exclusion "f" or any
part of exclusion "f" should be interpreted from a different per-
spective. The holding in Powers Chemco contravenes long-established
principles of insurance construction, and contradicts the single ex-
plicit reference to point of view in the CGL policy. Not surprisingly,
the vast majority of courts have rejected such an interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Insurance companies, businesses, and courts have become em-
broiled in lengthy, complex, and exceedingly expensive battles over
the meaning of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the stan-
dard form CGL policy's exclusion "f", utilizing resources that could
be spent responding to environmental damage. Despite the appar-
ent simplicity of the phrase "sudden and accidental" and the words'
frequent use in every day conversation, courts have encountered dif-
insurer's argument that estate of deceased not entitled to recover under policy covering
injuries caused by accidental means where insured had been intentionally struck and
pushed off elevated sidewalk by assailant).
130 See supra note 56.
131 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
132 See Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1949); compare
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1320 (5th Cir. 1982)
(intentional discharge by chemical waste disposal company constituted an occurrence
where policy did not indicate point of view and resulting damage was unforeseen and
unexpected by the damaged party).
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ficulty articulating and applying the common meaning of "sudden
and accidental" in the insurance context.
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. represents an important
step in moving toward a common sense judicial construction of the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion.
Claussen's articulation of the temporality associated with "sudden"
as an event's abrupt or unexpected onset may guide other courts
toward an understanding of "sudden and accidental" which coin-
cides with the goals and purposes of comprehensive general liability
protection policies issued between 1973 and 1985.
The limited pollution exclusion was developed, approved, and
included in the comprehensive general liability policy to limit pollu-
tion related coverage of property damage resulting from discharges,
dispersals, releases and escapes of pollutants that insureds did not
anticipate or intend. Post-claim underwriting cannot alter the envi-
ronmental problems we face. The challenge of businesses, insur-
ance companies, courts, public agencies, and society is to develop
responsible, realistic, forward-thinking environmental responses to
ensure a safe future without bankrupting valuable contributors to
society.
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